ABSTRACT U.S. stock prices have risen much faster than gross national product (GNP) during the post-war period. Between 1960 and 2000, the equity value relative to GNP more than doubled. We use a standard growth model to show that the rise in equity prices is what economic theory predicts. Changes in taxes, primarily changes in taxes on dividends, account for the large change in equity prices. Theory can also account for the fact that shock returns have been much higher than bond returns over the postwar period.
Introduction
A puzzling observation is the value of corporate equity relative to GNP is more than twice what it was in the early 1960s.
1 This increase is not the result of a decrease in the importance of debt financing; in both periods, debt was a little over three percent of the value of corporate equity. This increase is not because there are more productive tangible assets relative to GNP owned by corporations; the capital-output ratio has stayed remarkably constant. This increase is not the result of an increase in the after-tax profits of corporation relative to GNP; the share of profits in GNP is approximately the same now as it was in the early 1960s.
The question then is, why is the value of corporate equity so high now, or why was it so low in the early 1960s? We find that the large increase in equity values is due to changes in the tax system. There has been a large reduction in marginal income tax rates and greater opportunities to shelter income from taxes. The large reduction in marginal tax rates occurred between the Kennedy and Reagan administrations. Kennedy reduced the tax rate for the highest income bracket from 91 percent to 70 percent in 1963. Reagan reduced this rate first from 70 percent to 50 percent in 1981 and then to 33 percent after 1986. These cuts were only partially offset by the increases in 1989 and 1993 and the increases in the state income tax rates.
The effective tax rates are further reduced if the income can be sheltered from taxes.
Now most corporate equity is held in retirement accounts and as pension fund reserves. Contributions to these plans are not taxed and grow tax-free until they are withdrawn for consumption. A consequence of this is that the personal income tax does not increase the wedge between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation. For income outside of pension funds, there are now tax-managed mutual funds, with minimal transaction costs, that permit people to have more unrealized capital gains and less dividend income. In the early 1960s virtually no equity was held in non-taxed retirement accounts, in part because of strict regulations on fiduciaries, and there was little opportunity to shelter income. But people did hold stocks for their retirement and, on average, were subject to a tax rate near 50 percent on their dividend income.
Using the basic growth model, we derive a formula for the price of equity. The price is different than one because of taxes. Given U.S. fiscal policy, the most important tax for pricing equity is the tax on dividend income. In theory, a decrease in the marginal rate on dividends should increase the price of capital used in the corporate sector, but leave the quantity of capital unaffected. A fall from 50 percent to roughly 0 percent translates into a doubling of the price of equity. This is exactly what we observed: prices of equities doubled between 1960 and 2000, but the capital-output ratio remained roughly constant.
Furthermore, if the capital-output ratio does not change, then we would not expect a rise in after-tax corporate earnings as a share of GNP unless the corporate tax rate fell. Over the postwar period, the corporate tax rate did not fall significantly, and after-tax earnings remained roughly constant as a share of GNP.
Another implication of the theory is that the real before-tax return on the stock market should have been about 8 plus percent on average, as it was. The real before-tax return on equity is the return resulting from a change in its price plus the before-tax income return.
In the absence of tax changes, the return from price changes is equal to the growth rate of the economy on average, roughly 3 to 3.5 percent per year. With tax changes that imply a doubling of prices in 40 years, the capital appreciation return is higher by roughly 1.8 percent per year. Then, if we use the before-tax income return, we need to add another 3 or 4 percent per year to compute the total return. This implies an equity return that is more than twice the ratio of after-tax corporate profits to the value of corporate capital stock at replacement costs, which is and was a little over four percent.
This raises the question, what about the price of debt? In the early 1960s the real return on corporate debt was four percent so there is no puzzle there. But the return on government debt in the late 1960s and in the 1970s was low, much lower for example than the return that lenders realized on home mortgages. There are several reasons why this debt was held. First, a large amount of debt assets are held for liquidity purposes. Second, agents in fiduciary positions were legally constrained to hold only debt instruments. These agents managed large amounts of life insurance reserves and pension fund reserves. Third, transaction costs made holding a diversified stock portfolio infeasible for all except the large investors.
An important corollary of our findings is that there is no equity premium puzzle in the postwar period. A widely-held view is that the growth model we analyze cannot account for the historical facts concerning asset prices and returns, unless a fundamentally different preference ordering is assumed. 2 We find that observed changes in taxes and regulations generate an equity premium, with no need for an equity risk premium.
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We first use our theory to compare the effects of policies in place prior to the Kennedy tax cut and after the Reagan Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986. We view these periods as relatively stable and, therefore, well suited to steady state analysis. We then consider the interim period which we view as a transition period. In the period between 1963 and 1986, there were a number of changes, in addition to the decline in tax rates, that had consequences for asset prices. For example, inflation was high during much of this period, investment tax credits were introduced, and depreciation allowances were accelerated. We examine the effects of these changes on asset prices, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
In Section 2, we describe the basic growth model that we use for our analysis. In Section 3, we work through simple examples to demonstrate the basic ideas behind our results. In Section 4, we match up the model to U.S. data.
Theory
In this section, we describe the model that we use to price corporate equity and debt in the United States. Our intent is to match the model up with data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and the Statistics of Income (SOI). As a consequence, we include a lot of detail, especially detail relevant to the U.S. tax system. We also allow for two sectors in the economy -corporate and noncorporate -even though our primary focus is corporate equity. We do this because the corporate sector accounts for less than half of 
where t indexes time, c t is per-capita consumption,`t is the fraction of productive time allocated to nonmarket activities such as leisure, and N t is the number of household members.
The fraction of time allocated by households to market activities is denoted by n = 1 −`.
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The size of a household is assumed to grow at the rate of population growth, η.
The model economy has two intermediate good sectors -a corporate sector, denoted by 1, and a noncorporate sector, denoted by 2. These provide the inputs to produce the economy's final good.
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The noncorporate production technology is simple:
Here y 2 is sector output, k 2 is capital services, n 2 is labor services, z is a technology parameter that grows at the rate γ, and θ is the capital share parameter, 0 < θ < 1.
For our purposes, the corporate sector is the important sector and is more complicated.
It has both tangible and intangible assets. U.S. corporations make large investments in such things as on-the-job training, R&D, organization building, and firm-specific learning by doing.
These investments are large, and the stock of intangible assets has important consequences for the pricing of corporate assets. So we assume that production in the corporate sector requires both tangible assets, which are measured, k 1m , and intangible assets which are unmeasured, k 1u . In addition to capital, labor services n 1 are required. The aggregate production function for the corporate sector is
where φ m and φ u are the capital shares for measured and unmeasured capital, respectively.
Corporate firms choose capital and labor to maximize after-tax profits, and each period they make distributions to households. The problem that they solve is
−τ 1k,tk1m,t + τ x,t x 1m,t } subject to the production technology (3) and
where p 1 is the price of corporate goods, w is the wage rate, x 1m and x 1u are gross investments in tangible and intangible capital, respectively, τ 1 is the corporate tax rate, τ 1k is the tax rate on corporate property, τ x is the investment tax credit,k 1m is the book value of tangible capital, π is 1 plus the inflation rate, k 1m is the actual tangible capital stock, and k 1u is the intangible capital stock. The book value of tangible capital,k 1m , is used by accountants when computing tax liabilities. We also assume that the tangible capital measured by the government actually depreciates at rate δ 1m but the accountants use rateδ 1m when computing depreciation allowances. The right side of the capital accumulation equations (5)- (6) are divided by the growth in population (1 + η) because stocks and investments are in per capita units. The right side of (5) is also divided by the inflation rate from period t to t + 1 -with positive inflation, the real book value falls.
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Noncorporate firms solve a similar problem but face a different set of taxes. The problem that they solve is
subject to the production technology (2) and
where p 2 is the price of noncorporate goods, x 2 is gross noncorporate investment, τ 2 is the tax rate on noncorporate income, and τ 2k is the tax rate on property in the noncorporate sector.
There is a final good sector, which combines the intermediate inputs from the corporate and noncorporate sectors to produce a composite output good that can be used for consumption and investment. This production function is
where g is government consumption, 0 < µ < 1 is a parameter that determines the relative sizes of the corporate and noncorporate sectors, ρ ≤ 1 is a parameter that governs the substitutability of corporate and noncorporate goods, and A > 0 is a parameter that determines the units in which output is measured.
Firms make distributions to households who are the shareholders, in the case of corporate firms, or owners, in the case of noncorporate firms. The household maximizes (1) subject to their budget constraint,
with b t ≥b t and n t + l t = 1. Per capita distributions from corporate and noncorporate firms are denoted d 1,t and d 2,t , respectively.
7 The values of shares held in corporate and noncorporate firms are V 1s,t s 1,t and V 2s,t s 2,t , respectively, where V is the price and s is the number of shares held. The total number of shares outstanding is normalized to 1 in each sector. There is a management fee of φ t V 1s,t s 1,t paid each period t to brokers who manage corporate stock portfolios. Government bonds are also held and denoted by b. The price of these bonds is V b . Tax is paid on corporate dividends at rate τ d . Tax is also paid on wage income at rate τ n . Transfers of the government are denoted by κ.
The constraint on debt in (11) If debt constraints are not binding, then household debt, in equilibrium, is equal to revenues less spending, all divided by the interest rate, and the return on debt is equal to the interest rate, which is pinned down by preference parameters. If the constraints are binding, then the return on debt, in equilibrium, falls below the interest rate.
Government production is assumed to be included in noncorporate production. Finance of government purchases and transfers is achieved by the issue of debt and by the many taxes described above. The period-t government budget constraint must be satisfied each period and is given by
Note that taxes are proportional in our model economy.
Examples
In this section, we work through simple versions of the model to illustrate more plainly our key results. 
where s t is the number of shares held in period t, d t are dividends per share, and V t is the price per share. All other notation is the same as in Section 2.
Assume that firms maximize the present value of dividends, that is
where k t is the capital stock in period t and x t is gross investment.
From the household's first-order conditions, we get the following condition,
From the firm's first-order conditions, we get the following condition,
Notice that the capital-output ratio, which can be determined by this equation, is not a function of the tax on dividends. If we equate the right sides of (13) and (14), then we have
where the second equation follows from the definition of dividends,
From this algebra, we see that
The intuition for the result in (19) is that by investing, the firm avoids the dividend tax (assuming that dividends are positive). This makes the price of investment lower than that of consumption.
In this example, to get a large rise in the value of equities with little change in the capital stock, we would need a large fall in the tax rate on dividends. In the United States, there was a large fall in the tax rate on dividends over the postwar period. More recently, the top rate has risen but that rise has been coincident with the introduction of tax-managed mutual funds designed to avoid taxation of corporate dividends.
For our purposes, the relevant tax rate is the marginal rate paid on an additional dollar of dividend income. As an estimate of this marginal rate we compute a weighted average rate, averaging across income groups, for each year in 1947-1996. The source of these data are the Statistics of Income of the United States. The weight that we use for any income group is its dividend income divided by total dividend income. Thus, if the only group that earned dividend income was the richest group, then the tax rate we would compute would be the tax rate that this group faced.
We multiply our average marginal rate by the fraction of corporate equity outside pension funds. Equities in pension funds are not taxed so we include only the taxable portion of dividend income. The result is plotted in Figure 2 . 
whereas the relevant return for households is the post-tax return
If the theory can account for the large rise in equity values, and if dividends are of the same order of magnitude as in the data, then theory can account for the high reported returns of the postwar. The change in tax rates on dividends can deliver a large increase in equity values.
Dividends relative to GNP are roughly constant in the United States for much of the postwar period. The same is true in the model since steady state values of capital and investment do not depend on the tax rate on dividends. We need only pick production parameters that give roughly the right capital-output ratios.
Suppose the tax rate on dividends falls from 50 percent to 0 percent in forty years.
The fall in the tax rate implies that growth in equity prices will be roughly 2 1/40 or 1.8 percent per year higher than growth in GNP. Growth in per-capita GNP over the postwar period is 2 percent per year. Growth in population is roughly 1.5 percent in the early part of the postwar period and falls to about 1 percent per year near the end. So average growth in equity prices will be around 4.8 to 5.3 percent per year. To compute a return, we have to add the dividend yield. The rise in equity prices implies a fall in the dividend yield since the dividend-output ratio stays roughly constant. If, on average, the dividend yield is the range of 3 to 4 percent, then equity returns will be in the range of 7.8 to 9.3 percent. Eventually the equity returns have to come down as the dividend yield falls and tax rates level out.
B. Example 2. Investment Credits and Accelerated Depreciation
The fall in tax rates was quite steady while the rise in equity prices was not. Recall from Figure 1 that equity prices fell dramatically in the 1970s and remained low through the 1980s. Some of the decline was due to the fact that corporations did more debt financing at this time. But even if we include the value of debt, we see that corporate values fell.
Part of the fall in the value of corporate equities can be attributed to a rise in the investment tax credit. The investment tax credit was in effect between 1962 and 1983. In Figure 3 , we plot the ratio of total investment tax credits to total corporate gross investment.
The source of these data is the National Income and Product Accounts of the United States.
We think of the ratio in Figure 3 as a good approximation to our rate τ x . This figure shows that the effective credit rose coincidentally with the fall in equity prices and corporate values.
The highest rate was close to 6 percent.
In the mid-1970s, there was also a significant rise in inflation in the United States. In Figure 4 , we plot the growth rate of the consumer price index over the postwar period. The source of these data is the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Inflation is high in precisely the period that corporate values are low.
Suppose that we modify the firm's problem of Example 1. In particular, suppose that the firm solves
wherek is the book value of our one type of capital,δ is the rate of depreciation allowance, and other variables are as before.
If we do the same type of calculation as in Example 1, we find
where g(π,δ)k t+1 is equal to
α = λ t /p t , and λ t is the multiplier on the constraint that sets k t+1 − (1 − δ)k t equal to πk t+1 − (1 −δ)k t . This multiplier in turn satisfies
One can show that g(1, δ) = 0 and g(π,δ) > 0 with π > 1.
Adding an investment tax credit makes investing cheaper and therefore lowers the price of capital. It turns out that the accelerated depreciation allowances work in the same way -they make investment cheaper as well. In fact, the two terms, τ x and g(π,δ), enter in the same way. Later we will see if these credits are quantitatively important. Unlike the dividend tax, it is harder to see immediately from the formulas, how large is the change in the price of capital.
C. Example 3. Portfolio Management Fees
Our next example is a simple version of the model in which households pay fees each period for management of their stock portfolio. Consider a slight modification to the household problem of Example 1, namely
where φV t s t is the total per-period fee. 8 The household's first order condition in this case is
On a balanced growth path, V and k grow at the same rate. For now, ignore growth in the population, and assume that the growth rate of the economy is the rate of technological change, γ. If we redo the algebra from Example 1, then we have
and therefore on a balanced growth path,
Multiply the left side of this equation by k t+1 /k t+1 and use the fact that d t+1 /k t+1 is equal to i − γ, where i = p t /p t+1 − 1, in steady state. Then we can solve for V t to get
This equation shows that the fees could potentially have a large effect -since the interest rate less the growth rate is typically on the order of 1 or 2 percent.
For example, suppose the maintenance fee was 0.1 percent per year with i − g equal to 1 percent per year. The fee, in this case, deflates the equity price by 10 percent, which is significant. The effect on the return however is small, just 0.1 percent times the growth rate of V . If the growth rate is 3 percent, introducing the fee lowers the return by only 0.001.
Quantifying the Postwar United States
We now return to the full-blown model in order to match it up to the U.S. data. We are interested in postwar trends and therefore abstract from uncertainty. Thus, we will ignore any risk premium to equity.
A. The Value of Equity
If we use the model of Section 2 -which incorporates the various effects worked out in our examples of Section 3 -then we get the following formula for the value of corporate equity,
where
The value of equity in (30) assumes no changes in tax policy, inflation, or transaction costs.
Equation (30) says that the value of corporate equity is equal to the price of capital times the capital stock, summed over the capital stocks. The prices of capital are functions of taxes, credits, and fees.
There is one term included that we have not yet discussed. We add the capital of foreign subsidiaries k f , which is calculated by taking corporate profits from the rest of the world and dividing it by an estimate of the interest rate. [See McGrattan and Prescott (2000) for details on our estimation procedure.] In the model of Section 2, the rest of the world is included in the noncorporate sector. 9 However, our measure of the value of corporate equities includes the value of foreign subsidiaries. For this reason, we add k f before calculating the value of productive assets for our model. Table 1 shows average values for tax rates, inflation rates, and capital during the periods 1947-1962 and 1987-1999 . During these periods, there were no major changes in tax policy or regulations concerning asset markets. Thus, we view these periods as stable and suitable for steady state analysis. We also think that it is reasonable to assume that individuals in 1960 did not anticipate the large tax and regulatory changes that would come later.
B. The Pre-Kennedy and Post-TRA 1986 Regimes
In McGrattan and Prescott (2000) we assumed that tax rates on dividends are effectively 0 in 2000. Corporations do pay taxes on capital income. But taxes on dividends and realized capital gains from the sale of corporate equity are not taxes on corporate capital income. Someone can avoid taxes on dividends and capital gains by managing his portfolio is such a way that gains are unrealized capital gains. Dividends paid to pension funds, which now own half of corporate equity, are not subject to the personal income tax. Similarly pension funds' realized capital gains from the sale of corporate equity are not taxed. There are also tax-managed mutual funds, introduced in the mid-1999s, which are used to minimize taxes and financial fees while allowing people to hold well-diversified portfolios.
But our estimates in Figure 2 , which are not adjusted to reflect the recent taxminimizing innovations, show a rate of 18 percent in 1996, which is the last year that SOI data are available. As an estimate for 2000, we use an estimate in between 18 and 0, namely 9 percent. (See Table 1 .) But it is easy to determine how this estimate changes our results since the price of capital is proportional to 1 − τ d . Values at either extreme are plus or minus 9 percent.
To construct our estimate of V , we also need values for intangible capital, depreciation, the interest rate, and growth rates of technology and population, and the portfolio management fee. In McGrattan and Prescott (2000) , we used NIPA data to estimate all of these parameters with the exception of the management fee.
We estimated that intangible capital was equal to 0.65 GNP in the 1990s. We showed that corporate profits were too large to account for only returns to measured capital. We derived our estimate by equating returns in the corporate and noncorporate sectors -which must be equal in equilibrium. Hall (2000) argues that a rise in intangible capital could account for the recent surge in equity prices. But intangible capital cannot be the full solution to the puzzle unless we believe that such capital was negative when the BEA's value of productive assets exceeded the market value of corporate equities plus debt. So that we can focus on the effect of taxes, we assume that intangible capital was as high in the beginning of the postwar period as it was at the end.
In McGrattan and Prescott (2000), we estimated the depreciation rate on corporate tangible capital to be δ 1m = 0.066. We use this estimate when evaluating g(π,δ 1m ). Our estimate of the rate of interest is 4.1 percent. Our estimate of the growth rate of technology is 2 percent and our estimate of the population growth rate is 1 percent.
Unfortunately, measuring actual costs for holding stocks is not easy, but as we showed in Section 3, the results can be sensitive to the choice. We consider two possibilities, φ = 0 and a measure of φ found in the NIPA personal consumption expenditures. Brokerage charges and investment counseling services are measured. But these services cover more than simply the fees for managing stock holdings. As one measure of the fee, we multiply the total brokerage charges by the fraction of household assets in equities.
In Figure 5 , we show the steady state results for the two stable periods with φ = 0. If we use a tax rate of 0 for the latter period, our prediction for the value is 1.8 GNPs.
This is the level that was observed in the first half of 2000, before markets fell. If we use a tax rate of 18 percent and assume, therefore, that the recent introduction of tax-managed funds have not changed the effective rate, then our prediction for the value is 1.5 GNPs. This is 7 percent below the value at the end of 2000.
Next consider the effect of a higher φ. In Figure 5 , we assume φ = 0. Suppose instead that we use our measure of brokerage charges from NIPA. For the period 1947-1962, the NIPA estimate is roughly 0.1 percent (of the total stock values) and for the period 1987-2000, the estimate is roughly 0.2 percent. What is curious is the fee has doubled despite the many claims that the management of portfolios is done much more efficiently. The increase may be due to the fact that many more individuals are participating in the stock market. Whatever the reason for the increase, adding φ = .001 in the early period and φ = .002 in the later period means that the value of equity relative to GNP changes by a factor of 1.9 rather than 2. But the overall level would be lower. The steady states would be 0.73 and 1.38 rather than 0.81 and 1.65. Since the level is sensitive to φ, it is important that we accurately estimate its value.
The overall message of Figure 5 is that taxation, especially taxation of dividends, can account for the large rise in the value of U.S. corporations.
C. The Transition Period
In the period between 1963 and 1986, there were a lot of policy changes that affected asset prices. As we showed earlier, some had a positive effect on prices and some had a negative effect. Here, we consider the quantitative effects of higher inflation, investment tax credits, and accelerated depreciation using our model of Section 2 and data from NIPA and SOI.
These policies are summarized in equation (30) by the term 1 − τ x − g(π,δ 1m ), where τ x is the investment tax credit and g(π,δ 1m ) is the 'credit' from accelerated depreciation. In Figure 3 , we showed that the effective investment tax credit, when we average over all asset types, got as high as 5.6 percent. Since the credit affects the price of corporate measured capital, which is on the order of 1 GNP, an increase of 5.6 percent translates directly into a decline in asset values of 5.6 percent. While this is significant, it would not explain the large decline in prices after 1974.
What about accelerated depreciation during the high inflationary period? Annual inflation rates got as high as 14 percent and depreciation allowances improved -effectively doubling the depreciation rate for tax computations. We can estimate the effects on equity prices by using our formula (31) for g(π,δ 1m ). Suppose that tax rates are at their average levels for the period 1963-1987, namely τ d = .36, τ 1 = .42 and τ 1k = .032. Suppose also that the interest and growth rates are i = .041, γ = .02, and η = .01, respectively. Then, the largest value we would find for g(π,δ 1m ) for π ∈ [1, 1.14] andδ 1m ∈ [.066, .132] is 8.2 percent. This is same order effect as the investment tax credit. Together, they give a decline in asset prices in the range of 10 to 15 percent.
Clearly the large decline in equity prices during the 1970s needs some additional explanation. We have considered some obvious factors and ignored others such as the effect of the oil shocks and the effect of capital gains taxation.
D. Asset Returns
The theory predicts that asset values should have doubled between 1960 and 2000 and dividends should have grown at the same rate as GNP. These two outcomes result in the stock returns of the same magnitude as reported by the Center for Research on Security Prices -if we compute returns pre-fee and pre-tax.
If we additionally assume that households had a liquidity motive for holding debt and constraints on their retirement assets, we predict low bond returns and large equity premia.
In the first half of the postwar period, pension funds assets were almost entirely debt. There are good reasons for this. There are tight restrictions on pension fund managers. In 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was passed. This act made pension plan fiduciaries personally liable for imprudence or misconduct. Prior to that, fiduciary breaches typically lead to a loss of tax qualification for the pension funds. Such penalties were likely to be avoidable if pension fund managers held debt assets of various maturities, so as to avoid large fund losses and to facilitate on the timing of the distribution of benefits. Mehra and Prescott (1985) found historical U.S. asset prices and returns puzzling.
Conclusions
They did not take into account changes in tax and regulatory policies or institutions affecting asset markets. We do, and we find that the data -at least over the postwar period -are not puzzling. The large reduction in individual income tax rates and the increased opportunity to shelter income from taxation lead to a doubling of equity prices between 1960 and 2000.
In turn, this large increase in equity prices resulted in much higher returns on equity than on debt.
Notes
1 Mehra and Prescott (1985) define the puzzle in terms of equity returns, which have been significantly higher than bond returns when averaged over the last century.
2 See, for example, Abel (1990) , Boldrin et al. (2000) , Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999) , Zin (1989,1991) , Gali (1994) , Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), and Jermann (1998) . See also, Kocherlakota (1996) for a nice survey of the literature.
3 New theories emphasizing risk premia have largely ignored an older literature that emphasizes the interaction of public finance and finance. See, for example, Feldstein (1980a Feldstein ( , 1980b and Feldstein and Green (1983) .
4 Here, we abstract from all forms of heterogeneity in individuals. We view this as a first step towards understanding the interaction of stock values and the U.S. tax system.
Obvious extensions would allow for individuals of different ages, incomes, and abilities. See, for example, the work of Alvarez and Jermann (2000) , Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2000) , and Heaton and Lucas (1996) .
5 Because of our emphasis on taxation as a key factor for postwar asset prices, we analyze a production economy. See also Boldrin et al. (2000) , Cochrane (1991 ), Hall (1999 ), and Jermann (1998 who study asset pricing in production economies.
6 Inflation also has an affect through the taxation of capital gains since it is nominal gains that are taxed. Here, since we assume a representative consumer, the modeling of capital gains becomes tricky as one needs a buyer and a seller to analyze the sales of assets.
See Feldstein (1980a) for a discussion of inflation and capital gains. 7 We are assuming that firms pay dividends rather than buy back shares which is questionable if tax rates are high. One explanation is that paying dividends overcomes a moral hazard problem. Another explanation is legal constraints that firms may have faced if the IRS viewed the action as simply tax evasion. See Feldstein and Green (1983) 
